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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
It is necessary, when viewing a particular perspective
of the world, to define the limits of that perspective in
terms of some sort of finite base. The choice of that base
is arbitrary. Sociology, as both a methed of perception
and a collection of perceived data, has attempted, and is
attempting, to define the limits and boundaries of its
concern. 'fl —se boundaries art- ;.rhitrary constructs which
fre ti- historical z-hd sceio-cultural i'cc1.-
7,rounds or the individuals who have sought to define
phenomena from the stability of a finite base. The choice
of a system of patterned thought, manifest in, and gener-
ated by, ols, necessarily entails the acceptance of a
particular set of boundaries, within which communication
and perception is possible. The sociologist must work
and from, this arbitrary system of thought and
symbol in order to limit the boundaries of his concern to
tn realE of the fiEite. The liTits :.:hich the sociologist
constructs for himself, the values upon uhich such defining
is based, and the (=sequences of the beurc:Lry definitions




presentation will find its emphasis of concern.
The socielogist who claims to be value-free has for
too long either ignored or denied the significance of the
value assuriptions upon which his particular view of the
world is based. The internalization of the notions of
"scientism"1 has transformed, fer many sociologists, a
value based discipline, which finds its relevancy within a
particular historical and socic-cultural frame, to a per-
ception of reality felt to be both immanent and transcen-
dent. The adoption of the notion of "scientism" as a value
77ase, with thc parallel pretense of value-free sociology,
;cssrved, ironically, to hinder the study of the value
fra7.c of sceigy, to limit the 77—:rds of perception and
interpretion to a rcw accepted procedures and concepts,
and to isolate the discipline frc:7. its historical and socio-
cultural environment.
Sociology has become in many respects, a perspective
which has tried to insulate itself against the necessity of
value choice and ideology. In the very process of stating
its values so emphatically ("scientism" for example), it
has tended to deny the influence of values upon its own
1Felmut Schoeck and James Wiggins (ed.), Scient  sm and
Values (ew York: U. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 19b0), p. lx.
Scaoeck and Wiggins present scientism by stating that "the
word scientism conventionally 0.z-cril,es a type of scllarly
tipassing, of pseudo exactituc., of cmbracin.i7, incongruous
modt.is of scientific method and conceptualization. Scien-
tisr-: fosters not only the 'fads and foibles' of contemporary
sociolcpy, but is also in itself a symptom of an insecure
world view, of a negative social philosophy."
• perspective. !y this (lenial, the discipline has incor-
porated the notien of value-free sociology and ethical
neutrality to the point that they have become, in many
respects two of the major value bases upon which modern
mainstream sociology is founded.
Brcadly viewed this presentation has grown as a reac-
tion against sociological insulation, and is a basic state-
ment and analysis of the relationship between ideology and
sociology. It finds its immediate roots in the rejection
of the notions of "scientism," and posits the necessity of
ideologicr.1 c,-cicc as the l)ase from which both action and
nerce,)ticn - re e:ciived. Philescnhically, the posited re2:—
tionshir which eists etwee7. racts ;:nd v.iues s relatec:
to sociology) h; been drawn from the generalized notion of
-..he social construction of realit, which serves as a prime
postulate from which this presentation is extended.
The irrediate need of a discipline to establish sore
set of arbitrary finite boundaries should not be divorced
from the need to examine and analyze those particular
boundary constructs. In establishing the limits of interest
and action of a particular discipline, we necessarily in-
ude various phenomena within our realm of concern and
exclude ethers. The bc;:ndaries ;,hich limit those concerns
are the constructs el- our peculiar perspeetive (discipline)
an are the bzIsc: fouhc:ations wi thia which ceir of
yerceptIcn must fall. It is esseTitial that we who accept
the basic area and tenets of concern of each cf the
respective and varying disciplines (in this case sociology)
must constantly evaluate the boundary constructs that we,
ourselves, have constructed, along with their accompanying
limitations. 71(2 (tuestien is not that the boundaries exist,
hut that they exist so often without question.
It sees reasonable to state (at least from the auther's
ideolcgical bias) that as the nature of what is being
studied changes, the boundaries established for analysis
must also be flexible enough to change in order to include
new and significant phenomena within the constructs of con-
cern. It should be noted tnut the extension or li-Ating ci
such boundaries of int.rest are dependent upon OLHsiens
which follow frc:: srbitr..z pteL ;
tions. It is one of the main contentions of this presenta-
tion thnt a discipline such as sociology must constantly
refer to the socio-cultural circumstances within which it
operates, in order to make decisions concerning the expan-
sion or contraction f the arca of phenomena it is attempt-
ing to analyze and study. Relevancy, admittedly, is a
valile based on an ideological assumption, but within the
ccnfines of this presentation remains a very important one;
one which establishes both a direction toward which it is
felt sociolcgr must mcve ,s well n; a base from which it
must be extended.
This constant evnluation and reappraisal of the
„.)c - nc.ar, constructs of cur disciiline is an area which :-:as
leng been either blatently neglected or somehow
•
-transcended" by the Platonic notions of "scientisr;.- The
analysis of boundary constructs is closely related to the
concept that relevancy is found within a particular histor-
ical and !;ocio-cultural range of phenomena, and is viewed
as being based upon varicus ideological assumptions con-
cerning the n-ture of reality (and more specifically the
nature of :,aman interaction and society.)
In order for alternative systems of thought to exist
within the same discipline the boundaries of concern must
he open and dynamic enough to allow for at least the possi-
biflty of alternative conceptuaization and perception.
The notion :-.Lciolory is the study of concensus,' for
example, ne‘:(:ssar.: excludes an ::c roach within sociology
which tends to find its major en.phasis in the study of con-
flict. The (.2..istence of varying scopes and emphases of
perception, as well as the possibility of conflicting or
contradicters: analysis, concerning the same or like phe-
nomena, exists only within a discipline whose boundries
are broad enough to allow for the flowering of many schools
of theught.3 This emphasis on epenness, however, is often
threatening to the individual who is not able to cope with
ni degrees of freede7 or to the discipline w!,:!. is so
;;irth. -Ccir:Fcrsus Com7unio%tion,"
.2:Pr.ican V-1. . :-7.rth
stated, '7 rra T.1C s'17- -,TT—of co:-zenus ns t cortr,11 tas.L
of sociology."
fl no Ise-Tung, Quotations from Chairman ‘:ae Tse-Tung,
(Pcking: Foreign lailruage Presr, 19t6), p. 17)2.
insecure as to rely upon static boundaries to assure its
existence.
It is with these reactions in mind that the following
postulates are prescnted as a statement of relationship
between ideology and sociology. Included, as ;e11, is a
corresponding analysis of the conservative bias of both
structural-functionalism and present day conflict theory
(represented by Lewis Coser and Ralf Dahrendorf) as rajor
ideological perspectives within sociology. The examination
of the boundary constructs of sociology is an essential
task in establishing priorities for research, theory, and
7ethodolop. The acceptance of existing hendaries as a
priori, u.-,questienabh, limits of concern, is one nf tne
prime eler:.:7as in the development of an irrelevant, stie
discipline. The constriction cf alternative methods of per-
ception and conceptualization is a result of insulation and
the "scientism" prevalent in sociology. The following
postulates, hopefully, lay the ground werl: for a mere com-
prehensive examination of the boundary constructs of sccio-
logy, specifically in the relationship between facts and
values within an ideological frame.
There are several major tenets upon which this presen-
tation is rreunded. These postulates serve as the inmediate
value base frop, which the writing of this nailer is ctended.
r! a;,c1 aps ii'lrortant, is the acceptance cf the
notion cf the social construction of reality (and percep-
ticn). This concert is presented from a predominantly
11
:lannhcirian perspective and is the prime po.,:ulate upon
which the relationship between fact and value is established.
Secondly, it will be held that the presented relation-
ship between fact and value necessarily establishes an
immediate and i -:.pertant relationship between the boundary
constructs of a discipline and the values upon which such
constructicns are based. This relationship is seen, and is
applicable, to the relationship between ideology and socio-
logy. Within this immediate framework, concepts are seen
as manifestations of ideology as well as generators and
Ltaintainers of existin;_; ,,erc%ntualization and ideological
perspectii.(:.
The third 77!-positen holds Ih..T there are two 77::4)or
ideological strains of thought and pe cepticn within cc
temporary American sociology. These two inogical per-
spectives are as follows:
(1) structural-functionalism (structural-func-
tienalist theory)
(2) present day conflict theory
4
Finally it is posited that these two basic ideological
perspectives (stn:ctural-functionalism and conflict theory)
are "conservative" in nature. This conservatism is not
only a logical extension of historically conservative social
'II is necessary to note 1!--.t this presentation 2rnws
2% i=ediate and necessary distition betwcn pres::1
conflict theory ala Ceser and Dahrendorf and the "c3assi-
cal" conflict theory of Hobbs, Darwin, and 71arx.
thought5 but is ;:lanifest in the predominantly accepted
definitions of society and their logical perceptual conse-
quences.
The generally conservative ideological Lase of socio-
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generally accepted concept of equiliOrThm; a tion whl_h
itself stems from traditionalist ideas of "harmony," "con-
sensus," "like interests," etc. The concept of functional
unity found within many definitions of society leaves little,
if any, room for a permanently dysfunctional set of cate-
gories. The notion that society is comprised of a number
of interacting functional units, which necessarily maintain
the whole, excludes the
units may exist for the
portance of ideology in
very concept cf a society in which
destruction of the whcle. The im-
relation to the develop::ent of a
particular discipline cannot be divorced fro7.1 the conceptual
5
nchert Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition (New York:Basic Books, 1966).
1:•
apparatus and methodological manifcstations of that disci-
pline. II should rade clear, that the immediate purpose
of this paper is not the presentation of a new ideological
base frcr the stady of society may be directed, but
rather an analysis of the existing discipline in terms of







The neeesity of value commitment within a historical
and social context cannot be isolated from the relationship
between knowledge and its social base. Everyday individuals
are iced Lith decisions; decisions which are dependent upon
the values and definitions which are labeled as facts. The
reality that is perceived and tl- c manner in vhich it is per-
c: iv are both produ.:Tts of the social envilont into
which c is socia::zed. It is amazing th7.t
sol,L1loated as sociology .as eitaer largely Leglectcd
the study of its cun ideological base or systematically
denied the relationship between values and facts as an inter-
vening variable in the study of human interaction.
The non-pejorative use of ideology found within the
context of this presentation has grown basically from the
rejection of the notion that ideology is counte rposed to
science.6 This usage is based upon the concept that science
h.
':sathan Clazer presents three historical uses of the
term ideclogy: (1) ideology as coonterpesed to science; (2)
ideolc4_,y as the screen for the st:itus quo; (3) ideolol- y as
that ele7.cpt in all thought that ohi lizes the ferces of
cliage for the positive tr:-.sformatici, of society.
Ol4zer's artic1( 1!.; found in The Uses of Se(:iology edited byF. Lazarfold, fl. Sewell and H. L. Wilensky, (i- ev, York:








itself is an idcoloy. It is quite difficult to divorce the
ccncept of ideology irom previous historical misapplication
and to apply it differently to similar situations. !arx,
for the most part has been the base from which the sociology
of knowledge has been extended and in many ways provides the
concept of the social construction of reality upon which
this paper is grounded. A strict Marxist definition of ideo-
logy, resplendent with orthodo class analysis, has been
rejected for this presentation, however, with the use of the
term idcology becoming closely aligned with :1annheim's con-
cept of "perspective" found in Ideology and  Utopia. 7n
refening te one's perspective :1annhei7 Freaks of a
'eltanschuung or total outlook which is brought to any
situation where t, re exists the necessity of interpret
ticn. A perspective, thus, is a c1e T:cde of conceiving
things which is determined by the social settings and deter-
mines the manner in which one views an object, Yhat one per-
ceives in it, and hew one construes it in •s thinking.'
Following ::annheim, an ideology will be posited as an inte-
grated set of beliefs with corresponding sets of values
;-i.ich connotes assumptions about the nature of reality.
This definition of ideology differs from the traditional
concept of a rigid dogmatism often associated with the
ter:', and is a co7:posit of definitions presented by `tarry
7
Karl 71annheim, ideology and Utopia: An Intycduction




Hausknecht and William F. Connolly.
9
The relationship between values and facts as related
to a specific historical and social environment serve as
the base for assumptions concerning the nature of a per-
ceived reality. From this view of ideology there is an
immediate and necessary relationship between values and per-
ceived empirical facts; a relationship which is contingent
upon the social construction of perception. The notion
that facts exist in a system of "Platonic reality," devoid
of their necessary relationship with values, yet able to be
interpreted within the context of a social environment, has
in many ways become an assumption held by a large number of
social scientists. The notion of a value free sociology
has itself become a predominant ideological assumption
(value) which serves as a base for modern mainstream socio-
logy.
The image of a.value free sociology is more
than a neat intellectual theorem demanded as a
sacrifice to reason; it is also, a felt conception
of a role and a set of (more or less) shaTqd senti-
ments as to how sociologists should live."
1urry Ilausknecht, "Values and nainstream Sociology:
Some Functions of Ideology for Theory," American Behavioral
Scentist, vol. 9 (Feb. 1966), p. 30. "Ideology connotes a
set of values, i.e., assumptions about the nature of man
and society."
9— E. Connolly, Political Science and Ideology,
(:.ew Yorh: Atherton Press, 1967), p. 2. 'Ideology is an
integrated set of beliefs about the social zind political
environment."
"Alvin Gouldner, "Anti-:4inotaur: The .lyth of Value
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relation to a particular socio-cultural envirenment. The
affirmation of a particular value has within it an inherent
scope of perception derived from the framework of the value
itself. The areas that are to be studied find their origin
in the values which form the base of a particular perspec-
tive or ideology.
The predisposition to believe or label a particular
phenomenon as fact is based on ideological assumptions which
are the products of the sccial and historical environments,
and are the value bases which intervene in the perception
and interpretation of reality. Within this perspective we
are able to view two different levels of relationship
between facts and values which intervene in and influence
perception:
(1) Values that are derived from facts based on
an immediate a priori accentance of beliefs
(2) Beliefs (facts) derived from values which
have grown from the prior acceptance of other
beliefs.
Both of these levels of relationship serve as the value
bases which become intervening influences in the interpre
tation and communication of perceived data.
The notion of value free sociology draws a distinction
between the value position of the sociologist cutcidc of
the role of the sociologist and the detached professionalism
posited as a requirement contained within the role of the
scientist. Irving L. Horowitz has made an interestini, point





actually disappeared from the social sciences, rather that
the social scientist has become so identified with the going
value system." The social scientist does not leave his
values behind when he steps into the role of the profes-
sional. any of the overt manifestations of political
affiliation and religion may be outwardly rejected, but the
assumptions upon which the outward manifestations of belief
are founded are brought to inquiry.
The social scientist at work is not suddenly
confronted with the need to choose values. He is
already working on the basis of certain values.
The values that these disciplines now embody have
been selected from the values created in Western
society; elsewhere social science is an import.
Of course some do talk as if the values they have
selected 'transcend' Western or any other society;
others speak of their standards as if they were
,!j.mmanente within some exLs.ting n, ,pyrt
of unrealized potential. But surely it will now
be widely agreed that the values inherent in the
traditions of social science are neither transcen-
dent nor immanent. They are simply values pro-
claimed by many and within limits practiced in
small circles. What a man calls moral judgement
is merely his desire to generalize, and so make
available for others, those values he has come to
choose.11
The social scientist is not an isolate, immune to the
influences of his particular culture and society. The con-
cept of value free sociology alienates the scientist from
the resource he is studying and divorces him further from
the surrounding world. The scientist as a social person
participates in the selection of the problems of science
C. tCri;ht Nills, The Sociological Imagination (New
York: Greve Press, 19€1), p. 178.
-r
and is responsive to what Znanicoki has termed his social
circle. Whether :le considers himself a successful indi-
vidual in the treatment of a particular problem is dependent
upon the reacticn received from net only the immediate social
circle but frem the larger social forces and cultural goals
of his society rer sc. The techniques used by the social
scientist a:1d the data retrieved are judged by an already
existing ideological base as either an acceptable method,
an operative value which predominates as a professional
standard, or as a non-acceptable method with invalid data
stemming froo a misuse or rejecticn of the eiFting predo-
minate ideological 'case.
There is evidence that the so-called laws of
proof mov be r. rely-  conventional abstract
rules governio what are accepted as valid con-
versational etensions. What we call illogi-
cality is sirilar to immorality io that hcth ;:!'e
deviations from norms. . . . Criteria, or
observational and verificatory models, are not
transcendental. . . . Nor are they part of an
a priori or innate, equipment of the "mind" con-
ceived to be intrinsically logical.12
The technique, a complex of standardized procedures,
serve to make operative the predominant theoretical ideolo-
oi.sal base. The methods, which correspond to the theoreti-
cal assumptions are in themselves based on the assumptions
2enerated by the theory and thus .:Ay tend to lead to pro-
deter7.ined rosu]ts. Such a myopic rethodelogy sLrvos as a
suroportive structure for the ideological from which it
he l;-.11:.,; to ;:,alntain the accepted structured view of
12
0o. cit., Connelly, p. 84.
reality.
The posited relationship between facts and values pre-
sented in this parer is based on the acceptance of a general
7!annheimian view of the social construction of reality,
leading to the conclusion that the disjunction between facts
and values present in the notion of value free scciology is,
at least, improbable. The concept of ideology as a necessary
base of perception is extended from the idea of the social
construction of reality, and is in itself, from this perspec-
tike, a by-product r)f. 7. particular ideology 7. -ich has been
shaped by vrieus socio-ci!lturai bistorical
Ideolo:: is, , rer: r:tcd ar nicest in the arrangc.ent
of ]- crceptions label as knowledge and the 7anner in hich
that knewlee is collected.
The concepts upon which theory and research are based
and from which both are generated arc subject to the imme-
diate influence of the relationship between facts and
values. The very concepts we use are colored, necessarily,
by the ideological predisposition to view a particular
subject area in a particular way.
We begin with the fact that the sare wordor concept in most cases, means different thingswhen used by differently situated persons. . .even in the fornplation of cecepts, the angle
of visien is guided by the observer's intc rests
. . .everv cecept combines ithi itself only
that which, in the light of the investitor'sinterets it is esr,ential grasp and tc in-
corporate:1
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"vocabularies of 15 e:pressing an interpretation of
situated actions, maintaining a scope of perception for the
interpretation and relating of vurious phencmena, and gen-
erating a particular perceptual frame. The value base of
perception is related to the value base of symbolic commu-
nication by tLt. simple activity of choosing a word to des-
cribe and/or c).plain a particulal' perception. The
cation of ideological perspectives is necessarily related to
vocabularies of explanation and "motive" and is dependent
upon social Nature of perception and symbolic interaction.
15C. Wril,t Mills, "Situated Actions and Vocabularies
of :!otive," -ican Sociological Review, Vol. 5 (Occember,
l(2f40) pp. 9f'.1 -l7).
CaAPTER III
SCIETIFIC 1:I:IV:CATION: THE ALIE\ATION OF PROLLSS
The categorization of perceived phencrenon into various
niches of criteria necessarily entails the standardization
of characteristics by which such groupings can be made.
The methodologies of classification and consequent cate-
gcrization are important elements in the scientific process.
The base for rl,1AV process is dependent- upc, definiticnal
labelnp nrrc,L.Jures and is intirint:c1,- related to the ioh-
gical lolascs of definer ar.C. t
the labclin: process. The entire
involve0 in
pr,:ess rf e]ssification
and categorization is based upon the construction of defi-
nitions and groups of defined objects to be related in cri-
teria of siiiality. These criteria are themselves arbi-
trary constructs and are oriented toward the classificatic71
of like elements between separate entities.
It is F. A. Eayek's contention" that the process of
creatin new criteria of classificatio.i anu redefining
a1ren.7 defined perceptions is in itself an alienating fac-
tor further sepan,ting the "reality" of knowledge from 4:U.t14,1 4 ,
• Eayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science (yew
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construction of similarities between separate entities, and
is one of the main processes involved in t c construction of
a separate "reality" of science.
The concepts used in establishing and classifyi14; the
various perceived characteristics are in themselves felt to
be "real" in the sense of being synonymous with experience.
The naive rez:lism which uncritically assumesthat where there are commonly used conceptsthere must also be definite "given' thingswhich they describe is so deeply embedded incurrent thought about social phenomena that itrequires a deliberate effort of will to freeoneselves from it.
The creation of a "scientific reality" is dependent urcn
.,.ntcatic% of the model construct with exeric:---, and
is represcnt;.tive .hat Alfred c.
"fallacy of r.,Isplaced concreteness."
There arc several lecls c scientific rcificatiun
related to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness with which
this presentation wills deal. Richard . Weaver presents two
types of vocabularies which the individual (including the
scientist) uses in the process of labeling and classifica-
tion of perception.19 These types of vocabularies are
related to the levels and degree.: of scientific reification
1.e11 as to the 1-:-cad relationship between "reality" and
1:.s.uage en toto.
' id., p. 54.
19.:!elmut Schccc and Jares 41.,L;gins, eds., ScicrtIsr-Values (c.1.- York: O. Van Nostrand Co. Inc.,
417.'" •
"Pc:;itive- terms, as Weaver presents them, stand for
perceived objects which are material entities, capal)le of
illysical identification and measurement. In general
language construction "positive" terms are usually nouns
with the degree of disjunction between the symbol and the
referent (the entity to which the symbol refers) th ,,ugh
arbitni-y, being minimal. "Dialectical" terms, on the other
hand, oriOnate and derive meaning on a higher level of
abstraction. They emerge frcm the "world of ideas" and con-
sist of a meaning which is reached not through (normal)
sensory percerti,n, .Lit through the processes of definition,
inc:usie• , exe2usion, and implieatien.20
Wc;:vr re7 :F to pc:At (at least through implication)
th:A thc closer the symbol is to the referent, in teims of
icsL;er degrees of abstracion, the more representative that
symbol is to the "reality" of experience. The higher the
level of abstraction the wider the disjunction between exper-
ience :Ind syml._01 construct. "Positive" terms therefore tend
to be mere representative of the reality of experience since
they are on a low level of abstraction while "dialectical"
terms become more divorced from experience, through the com-
rl(xities of hi ,4her degrees of abstraction.
compleities f symbol construction and its
-i-1,2cssnry relatirnship lith the entire process of scientific
t-iLtion is an essentiN1 cloi%,:nt in the inclased
p. 8.
disjunction between -scientific reality" and the "reality of
experience." The collectivism of the scientific approach
further complicafes and multiplies the inherent isolation
between symbol ccnstruct and experience (perception).
The soLiologist is not immune to these basic ontological
and epister,ological problems concerning the fallacy of mis-
placed concreteness. The very precess of developing a par-
ticular disciplinary jargon and creating a perspective for
the interpretation cf reality (the reality of experience)
necessarily entails a sociological process of reification.4
Sociology, as all other perspectives which interpret and
define perception, constructs a sociolegical reality
74
abstracted from experience and dependent upch symbols an,:
ik cc:;.cepts fr it c,istence. The rea]tv of ::::ciology is
1
4
abstracted reality in a dialee , cal sense (Weaver's U
tic) which often e:i—takes its own creations for the reality
of experience. The concepts which are constructed are often
viewed as positive terms while actually, according to Weaver,
they are dialectical terms which have been nistal:en for the
positive representation of experience. Too often the models
which the scientists (sociologists) in a sort of theoretical
game are transformed into what is considered to be a -real"
representation of perception. In a Weaverian sense we move
from positive to dialectical terms with the t -,- o realities
becoing confused.
"ihe entire sociological reification-process is based on
the transformation and movement from the -world" of h1:3;:an
--mitsir7.•remtr,WMPIPprrtillirafir"'
•
experince thrca0 inteIpretatic,n catep,orization, to -j.e
reality of sociely.
• • .the world in which science is interested is
not that of our given concepts or even sensations.
Its air l is to produce a new organization of all
our experience of the external world, and in doing
so it has not only to remodel our concepts hut
also to get aay from the sense Tualities and to
reploce,;:hen by a different classification of
events."
The elenerts of the reality of s:-ciology are the definitions
anl concepts which are used to structure and interpret per-
ception, and the perspectives which serve as referent points
for viewint: the world of human interaction. The construe-
tin :es of Lur..an interrclatips and experience
:ace l process Tierce a;, LeLeve tL,
- of The ralse (l'etrc for the of se_.
icy is generally the maintchance of the sociological
reality.
The general creation of realities separate, but
supposedly reflective, of human expea-ience is a part of an
alienation process created by the necessity of syr,bolic
interaction (thou. complicated and rultiplied by the
fallacy of risplaced concreteness and the collectivism of
the scientific approach). The self-isolating perspective
of the C,jectivo, value-free observer is Lut onc of the im-
pol;sibilities 1,aectrtinf„., the sceial : -It711-o of perception)
scientit creates a dn-ncti;:n Lete
cx;,cricrice.
21F. A. !,dycl., op. cit.,
• • ,
It is necessary when dealing on an onto1ogiez.1 level
epistemological concerns (especially from a meta-socio-
logical perspective) to deal in dialectical terms while
analyzing a construction of abstract realiti. it is with-
in this framework that this presentation will ccntinue to
analyze the reality and perspective of sociology and its




There arc two major sociological perspe..tives (ideolo-
e;ies) with corrospoLdin: ter:,inologies with which this pre-
sentation will be immediately concerned. Both of these
perspcctives ry be viewed as rajor directions within the
same sociological reality. Boa are subject to the same
ihitations t3n, an(' the fail-cy
et tb rc ar:.itrari conceptuei ;:lodels
It is the contention cf this raper that general
e(juilii- ri,A. LI ok:.s._%sos thcory is the pre:,;:.1 -,ant socio-
gical perspective from which observed phenomena are defined
and cat( cri -. Flcsent dry ccL:'lict theory on the other
-.nu serves as thc suLordinant secondary factor of ideology
used as a referent point for classification of perceptions.
istoricaliv the role of equilibrium theory may be
tracct: througl: :load range of disciplines z,.:1,7 :pcncral
Hi teoly. Ueveleping in the physical science:: prior to
(-A.
3:-
Ck171CC i - t
t4...• estal:qL-cnt
construct serve: a fir;ite
base for the Jc.: ctien of logical extensions (or exclusions)
31
i
of the unknown 1qu ii i r iuu eca::,e the i..ethodc-
logical rrocess of inposing ordei and structure on an
alTarently chaotic universal condition. The ntural and
physical sciences Lecame increasingly based en postulates
of equiliLrium and developed complex theore;.s and 3NiOES
frcm 1.::ich logical patterns and deductions could he pro-
jected. The desired emulation of the natural (and physical)
sciences by the seeial also included the adaptation of the
existing "scientific" methodology, as well as the general
frame of reference of the equilPlriun perspective. - According
to Cynthia :iissett, —;he rise and di-s-inatIon of the con-
of is : :rt of t!le in r.cientific
The gencral trend Toward the discovery of a ronistic
explanation of a perceived universal system developed as
the intellectual atosphere from which the social sciences
Lere born. The broad operational processes and harmony cf
the universal order were felt to he within the reach cf
hur,an understanding only if the methods of scientific class-
ificaticn and categorization were employed. Perhaps one
of the major intellectual transformations which grew out of
o:thi hysicA seiLnces rcl,t(: to the
of nistic oriertatien vas 1.1:e
cf oe7.co of equiliL1- 11 with the on ismcf
75
LynthiED,Oc The Cenceilt rf Fcluili7;rium  in
A7ericun lhour4ht (:,ev 1:a\ cu, Con:-.ecticut: Ya:e [Inc=
vcriTress,:777;—F. 14.
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universal laws ef order. The reduction of practically all
cf the scientific orientations to a L.st1C base beTan the
widespread acceptance of the general notion of equilibrium
which wculd ireatly effect the scope and direction of the
develc.ent of the social sciences.
In :.;Latever form it :f:ight take, the doatrine
wa:, clearly favorable to the sharing of concepts,
rethods, and principles among diverse areas of k4iow-
le4e. Asserting that the sal_e laws operated in
every sphere of reality, it encouraged erployment
of identical methods of analysis and of identical
theories in every sphere. . . . Because the
natural sciences developed earlier than tie social
sciences, this borrowing of ideas perforce pro-
ceeded froif, the ferrer to the latter, rather thai..
the othcr ',:ay around. In extreme cases. .
borrewi::. ::.:-;-,mtej very nearly t reduction of
sec- MI to ics; in oth.:1- cases the con-
cert.al I. (f phy;ics was %ltered to
Cata."
lhe 1,'ea catien and methodology
iad becc.c.e inraind theughtlays wit ii the .ccial
scientist began to work. With the acceptance of the broad
perspective of monism and consequent notions of equilihrium
and order, the traditional conceptual apparatus and F,ethodo-
logy of the physical and natural sciences were adopted as
tools cf the newer social sciences. The collectivism of the
scientific approach per se was (and is) easily reconcilable
with the br(z-c-: r.c,:jstic perspective a:,0 consequent cc%cept
of couiliLrhi- tic major t,o,2i of science held.







lase of fre, nu ronistiL :ase it
quite logical and -nott.ral' to lUL5 for the tsse:,tial
ties of 1iLenL:,-. !- et-ween ,0114ALAA.
--
ent;ties throunh the estahlish-
Lt.nt or r aod cateorization.
The secloi seie:.ees readily o,I.opted t C;.e . -.cral per-
!-Tecti..c of the aatura: nC physical,
Lase and outleoi., a:,d the inLerent
eollecLivism. For the socinl sciences the :7:option of
the general ideelogical orientation of to natura: sciences
not only -ea::t the of the stability or a:. neepted
systeL. or cle(:Ty :crspectl..
_ithoui thea t _ :f a -:teraative. social
: t 7 c.:solvL,r. t .e scope
-rLality or the ;u:l."ral sciences. ::c :.:ent of a
differ :..t c,f an
for theory and riethod, did not taLe place.
Trncing the ;t:,c1e1e1„7y, Cov.te, 'Thencer, and
711 7:e used as eAampl in th, :.:nalysis of the
ent of an ioclei;v. 7or Co.71te the
rer HerLert Spencer the engineer, for Lester ';:ard the
scie7tific categories had Lecor.:c central ways
of i=civin: c:osfyin the input perceptions. Thcy
did not di\cHt of t: :r trndition,t: :.;.t.7.,eds or
catecrizuth.:11, t
societ,
emul:Ition of the natural and :',hysical sciences (especiall)
physical), Lased en tLe ,:,cneral perspective of a peitivisti,
-JnisTI and equil Lriun. The eollectivis'l of the scientific
approach as related to the concept of equilibrium can be
seen in ,:o7:.te's notion of endeavoring to grasp social
piena as - holes,' as well as his idea of the unity of
unvaryin natural lavs.
The n,:!ticn of equilibriur. was a ccncept and
rcno-
nerc'leCtiVe
which was accepted as a base for viewing and categorizing
perception which through widespread dissemination, became
an ideolegy froli which and toward which the theory and
1--,:ti:cd of socieln:Ly grew. It -,euld La' been eKtremely
Y. intell de.:ept-
sociology and the —era?
to c. : , other direction. The,12h a tr:"dit: n
of radier:1 cTill_. did e.. t ;as ceitainly
not in the nainstream of the intellectual vogue nor was it
the base frm which the natural and physical sciences could
logically be extended.
Corte reactd strongly against the Enlightenment and
the French evolution and posited that his "social physics"
(though he drew chiefly from a biological rodel) would help
to 1)rin, order ol:t of chaos 27 Eis basic conservative
interests cnabled h o readily accept thc stability of the
exis:tant sc;entific Fyste::, and tL, :,, encral concept of equi -
ri T:. aat ref: to exter,s ion. of ':-.ur.lan







freedom and potentiality found within the bread revolutionz.:ry
views to which Comte was reacting prompted hi: to view true
liberty as -nothing else than a rational submission to the
preponderance of the laws of nature.',28
The biological model from which Comte drew his perspec-
tive of sociology enabled him to view the relationship
between two entities (the living thing and its environment)
as the pri;7ary base for societal study. The biological
perspective of the homeostatic theory of organisms was easily
transferred to the social, finding a parallel theory in Comte's
idea of equilibrium.
Cor:tL. ei•;tomi:ed t e relatr between living
thing: a;:.1 the:ncrld !r. which the:lived in a
sinnlc phrase: it as an 7 ' Ton tl•:e
Cortcin soc.12.1 statics concerned itse2i, by
definition, wAth the conditions of
onte's primary perspective of human society was based on the
central :.otion of cy-.104, unity, and harmony. The creation
of 1-,unan laws rercly reinforced t7le laws of order 'Ahich We're
A.ready present.
All artificial and voluntary order is simply a
prolongation ef the natural and involuntary order
to which all Lo-aa society terds.30
The orzallic no‘:el which so fascinated Cc-...:tc way further
cc;te, Posith,:  2 von:. (Lon-







c...pand:d and trnnsforned into sociolocal theory by ::Lrbeit
Spencer. The basic equilibrium vie. IC and systemat-
ically dealt with in relation to the evolution and existancc
of human society. 1hough quite similar in content, Spencer's
physical and natural science referent was physics rather
than Lf(..logy. Evolution (progress), however, fer!ained a
vital part of his general sche;-lata and became the central
principle within which the concept of equilibrium found a
:;iajor role.
Equilibri"r within Spencer's sociological perspective
had a t\:ofold role. First, it 1.:z:s the forctJ through which
society .,:as ocr,stont • pressis Cevolvinl constantly
:10V , 7-:- 5,01.- %2
arose. And secondly, it was the goal of that movement.
1:qui1ibr 4 um 1.)ee not only the recham el progress but
the goal of that particular movement of societal evolution.
Society, therefore as an organic and dynamic equilibrium
was perceived as a "system of mutually dependent parts
severally performing subserving maintenance of the ccmbina-
tion."31 
Given the perceived nature of the physical and
natural universe it became necessary for Spencer to broaden
the scope of equilibrium. By adding the relationship of
evolution and Trc.:r(:, an aspect of functional unity of
ele:,ental parts to the notion of equilibriur, he constructed
a societal parallel te complii.:ent the physical and organic
31:lu3sett, op. cit., p. 38.
411.,
edels from Aich he drew.
The movement involved in the idea of progressive or
evolutionary equilibrium added a new dimension to the general
applicability of equilibrium theory to socilogy. In the
e sense that wonism became the base for the projection of
scientific 1:ossibilities for the natural and physical
sciences, equilibrium became the base and general ideology
within which the social sciences could logically operate.
While so quickly criticizing the negativism of radical
philosophy for its supposed determinis, the L'eterminisn
inherent i! .!!), conceptual monistic fra:le was ignored. The
very net ion el' universal laws !!eccs:7.aril; :Le idea
of infinite I:edom and C.ance i:7poses upon a -niverse
of chaos, :11.Ltion and pre-determined nredictibility.
Science is bas .7 cn the necessary acceptance of imposed or-
der, if only in theory, if any system -of logic is to be
extended and for any creation of sy7bols to exist.
The arrival of equilibrium theory on the American socio-
logical scene can be exumined in relation to the developent
of the sociological perspective of Lester F. Ward. Ward,
emerging from a natural science background into the social
sciences, held to a strict monism nd soon hcgan to Ocvelep
o co:Icept central to his !,ocielogical perspec-
Fcciety and rrogress, fcr rd,vLrz, eT! the
sta'. i I of liter;.eting seciet.17 ,
u iii r auv.-:,d‘,1]: was flexible enough to .!apt and change
,len confronted 1 -:_11 varying circu:tanees. The Spencerinn
'-: .L, !,L:tiL, Lp ::. 7. ic cti-
1;:i :1..:-.:(..ti.:rLs
•:.-L:.; .. ..Itc. ,.:-; :.. -,:i:i: .:... ,
.crfLct :, ,,,,:11:,:-. ..:, ar.C. t.. cuilvor-1
• :-..M1 ,_. 11HI:',_ri; L ..k1 A-::,. . . .
(.. 't 1 1/4.(. 1/4.. i I, • .. t;..•- i fi6:,..
a;.
C1-0 i'L -icoption, fro- t;ic
LLAJ:cif,
,z‘:-:io;ls of t:c , y e;Arcric:A
soon in 1;A: f,revalcnoo of tile
..1proac:1 in :,,crican socioloy i tie
).1Sl. Of cunf'oLsGs c co-A:opt
fro:, ::Lic% sir crui-
A L \ . L11
'EvollitioL of .4..ructurcs,'
_ cr vul. (2:,4-c7), CX;5.
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37.%s an c:,,at er se of 1:.e ele_e_ts foun vi tin. dcrI:Itions ersociety 1,-,11Lfiyss
...e,sentcL:. Cut cf a •...rvey son t, cnty definitions
itjn select i%troducto.. socielofy texts
);escnted. ';Lcso catei,c-ries ca: 1,eeled as euoiction, system, self sufficient, couun
ILtcrest. Cf -C2est definitions cif:nt included the ccncept
ceoperatiin: se.c.1 cf syster.,s; four of solf suffiLiLnt;
seven er •sue. 10 1.cre overlaps of inclu-sic.is and cc definitions contained .:ore tLan one oftao conceptu:A cle .nt.
77 7
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. . .Fron the standpoint of collective behavior
cultural traits may all he reduced to thc one term
-consensus.- Society viewed ahstractly is an organ-
ization of individuals; considereO concretely it is
a complex of organized habits, sentiments, and
social attitudes--in short, consensus.-)"
Lewis hirth has also i.aintained that the ccntral focus of
sociology is the study of consensus.39 This tremendous
erinhasis en thc consensual frame extended fro: the broad
action of equilit,riu has 'ecomc the theoretical and methodo-
logical base for the predominance of structural-functionalist
theory in contel:Torary sociology.
Structural-functionalisn appears to he the logical ex-
ensioa anL parallel of the general ilibr frame of
refernc I iu in tlic e.r1y,:...-clopzA:nt of :..-;cc:oicy.
raluns,
etends the notion of dynamic equilihrium J;-: consensus to
/he point of creating an almost monistic preoccupation with
(_onceptual eleme.lts ;sumber oi
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order and stal!ility. In Cuser the C.' 4 1-c-.0 role that
plays a! a base for socioleic-1 analysis, LS
-11 as the any other social sciences, lavid Easton reLarheA
(refering tc
• • .it represents perhaps one of the few analyti-
cal uiit;tjcnskc (Al to all social iesearch. .
thc•17 11 iri stnds at tie clo:-est
",vA atic.n to ,c.‘,Iera: eery ll.at.cz.n lc found
in tic field of social science--'
Thc 11; itLd l'onistic lase fro..1 wIlich present day equili-
brium and consensus theory is extended is manifest ;.arisedly
in the scope and tradition of thk structural-functionalist
_pproa,:h. 1:1 1 hat- stated i.ile
:elati .Lon el( c: f--;ct lis
I' r histrical i:e:71. •
. . to. .ic postulates, those of consensus and
of dyna: ic equililriuT1 or itegration. Poth of
these ass, .pt ions can Lc traced !acl, to Cor..te, and
have peri.ctid Luch of Pritish "alerican socio-
logy and anthrwology. . .acquiring the sanctity
of traditions.'
The Lasie eollcctivisr. of the :-.onistic pelz,pective is
ckident In structural-functionalis reductienist tendencies
toward the integral unity of functional elements. This
collectivism coupled with the monistic equilnricn7. outlook
7ives the structural-functionalist approach characteristics
co:...lon to the latie, eihteen'H cLwtry sciences. The
id ':;!StLF, !:e
-;cience,- i or''cience C;pril, 1::1 ), pp. 1A:2.
!erre van den Lerghe, "i!ialectic and Functioralism:
a ciyntLesi:;," .',;.;erican Sociological TIeview, 23 (Cctaer,
12)67),p. 6(_;6.
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ilu.;cnt da; cqui:—,:in--,ensenso-, perspective (L.anifest in
!,truct.:al-fantionalisv-) in a !iilar :ncr maintains tile
conservatism of thc early discil.linary development and per-
pctuates a !.i -rilar systematic preoccupation with crder.42
While t7fing to maintain a professed standard of objecti-
vity the struclural-functionalist often regards rapid change
as being dysfu2lctiona1.43 With function as a majer clement
of egallibria:. and stability, dysfunction necessarily assumes
a negative connctation with its logical consequence being
intability and disunity. It is necessary for the structural-
functionalist to :ake value judgments if they are tc doscriLe
any catecri:;:le!: of perceived phenomena. Ferce:.t ,as arc
asder:j as positive frur: ideole-
cal b - sc, ur fy: that matter el- t1;fl neutral. St.i5ity for
the structa:a2-4:anctionalist is a major concept wilt
favorable connotaticns, whereas dysfunction and instability
receive negative perceptual judgment and within the broad
range the perz,i-,..tive are negative terms (1- lues).
The structuial-functionalist ideology was spawned fiem
a conservative reaction to the Enlightenment and the Frenchpi
;-4
Revolution. its roots lie in a conservative equilibrium
tradition based on the collectivism and monism of eighteenth
42. ..Lce,t A. ..'.gbet. "Conseis'tisr and Sociolc,7y,-
cza „lcalna: of auci,logy (Septel_aer, 1'.3S2), pp. 169-175.
,ar,.ns, "Soc an,idoratie,ls on t!:c c of
.ocial Change,' nar-1 ':c1. 26 (Septc:-...ber,





century science. Thout h adjust; deal :ori
cenvinc_ingly with the notion of change, 1: ssic e. hasis
on the equilibriul of society an:. the mai%:_sance of erder
re.lalas t't lase Cor nest all structsrs1-_,...... nal theory
and research. This -Utopian" notion ef stability44 ::.anifests
itself in the riajor conceptual tools of sociology. The very
ccseept of y:utual dependence, ,:ith an extreme ci;Thasis on
systems analysis, has become associated quite regularly with
the equilibrium approach.
The historical development of the structural-functionalist
auproach is in actuality the history of an idec ogy 1.ith con-
,:::::cdtaal tools and pens.;
research and theeu-. In any Ci the ,:cvelcp
men: of sociology reflects the censervatis. of eighteen 
century sc:cntific collectivis snd feend its
most immediate expression in the equilibrium and consensus
theories so vital to structural-functionalism. As Re)ert
hibet remarls,
The paradox of sociology. . .lies in the fact
that although it fails, in its objectives and
in the political and scientific values of its
principal fiures, in the mainstream of modernism,
its essential concepts and its perspec-
tive places it much closer, gcrlerally speaking,
philc,sophieal conservatism.
14 .,
.ahikndorf, 'Cut of Tol.ar.: a '..- eerienta-
of ,:ecloloic Joarnal of Srciolc,
(Scptt,L1, IT. 1:s-isi.
Letere -isset, The Socicio,:ical Tradition (New York:




(via :6;.to, Flonccr, and yard) as a conscrvativc
r,Lcticn to t.:c :.z_nifestations of revolution, Me
71-Lnc:. 2cos nut rit,atc... tilc radical
,
. . .
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sociological traditi,m frcich tc.
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structural-functionnlist ideology. Though present day con-
flict theory does offer a varying set of conceptual tools
with different connotations and denotations, its base is
still built upon the static traditions of eighteenth cen-
tury science.
The historical forms of conflict theory are
not sir.:ple historical curiosities, they for:,; a
developing tradition. . . . Conflict theory
arose in the general ideological a/Tosphere that
gave birth to positive organicism.4°
Forming within the same intellectual atmosphere, much
or the radical critical philosophy of the latter eighteenth
early nineteenth centu:y took on thc menistic character-
istics fre,_ iiich equilibrinr1 theory cmered. The general
Ne4,elian dialectic was based ci the "absolute'. evclutic%ary
(progressive) move77tent toward what flcl tcr,lieLl as Spirt.
Even in the gener:il transformation of th in dialectic
into dialectic materialism by Marx, the basic monistic frame
of science became translated into the inevitibility of
his
At the end of all the dialectic movement (both Hegelian
and 'Iarxian) is stability. The progressive evolutionary
characteristics of negation were arbitrary stopped by both
theorist; Hegel with Spirit and .!a.rx by cermunism and the
withering away of the state. `Iarx, however, did modify the
cr- ticln of his diAectical prc.,:csF se that .ically the
T.Yr'CCSS of 1-( L tic__;. c(-1:7t1 cease thudcc. of a
4r,.;,)!1 '7zIrtii:dale, The :Thtuit Tv_i-es of Sociological
Theory Uoston: Foughton Co., 160), p. 176.
JO'
classle!-s society. Lven through the negation processes of
the necessity cf -cvolutien found within "arx, the conserva-
tive intellectual and societal frame within ,hich he was
orking did necessarily influence his perspective.
iy and large sociological conflict theory
has found its lodestar in stability. Precisely
because of its acceptance of the universality of
conflict, the vdication cf society is found in
achieved order.47
Given the inherent conservatism of a broad Hegelian and
':arxist frame, the extension and development of a revolu
tionary dialectical perspective did offer the possibilities
of an niternative sociological ideology fre:. .hich to classi-
fy phc:, • cna. The : - 17 .-.:ical jhy of
neaticn ':0 offcr as , :-1:e s
thLor>. ../100&. 1-"C focus sci—hee
..ou,d necessarily hve chringe.i, the pe,sibility cf creating
an alternative scientific method based upon inherent develep-
mental processes of negation of organis7s (entities) rather
than collectivism did (does) exist. Sociology, 1.0hCIY,
parallelif. its predecessors did not develop along those
particular ideological lines. There is vithin the disci-
pline thcugh a partial viel. of the ideclegical perspective
hich col.Alt.: have bccore the pre;:- ideo.lc,:,ical frame
sociology if w.erc fully develc:cd 1-1-cr a Liffercnt philo-
sGphical ground.
If ings1e :tavis asserts, sociology 2r- ac-.:ally
47Ih1d., p. 206.
4
functionalisnl disguising itself ti rough merely the guise c;
a different label as has been al.!,trted48 then all intra-
disciplinary approaches are logically the consequent of the
functional ideology. Even if, however, the assertion of the
synonymous relationship between seciology and functionalism
is rejected, the negation of the immediacy of the relation-
ship does not necessarily follow. The base of much of socio-
logy is grounded deeply in the functionalist approach. The
question that must be answered if some understanding of the
relationship between functionalism and its related parts
(consensus and equilibrium) is to Le derived may be stated
as follows: Is the relationship between the functionalist
base of sociology and equilibri.. neLtssary (7,1c if socio-
logy is to rzintain even the ac:,;'ta%cc of uhat it tradi-
tionally interprets as the scientific o.;tiook? In other
word's, does sociology necessaril have to preserve its
equilibrium outlook even if it maintains the traditional
functionalist base?
There are several possibilities w7lich arise that r2.1,
serve as answers to the above questions. Conflict theory
as it new stands works primarily from the same type of ideo-
logical scientific Lase as does structural functionalism.
Though immediately grounded in the sa..ic (or similar) philo-
sophical process the emphasis ten2.7 to becorc soncLow
48Bert Adams, "Coercion and Consensus Ihcories: Some
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sc Iccis it
lar :,;.rt in Cosor's ;ash: persF,ective the
cr docs nc ;-,.!cessarily eNclu or
t
limit a functionalism based also on eonflict. Coser has
negated the necessity of equilibrium from the general func-
tionalist perspective, as '!arx was able to do prior to the
rise of the identification of functionalism with equilibrium
The relationship between functionalism and the concept of
conflict is as valid as the overly propogated notion of the
identity between equilibrium and functionalism.
Coser elaborates from a Simmelian frame upon the func-
tional aspects of conflict in his book The Functions of 
Social Conflict. Though he is trying to develop a viable
intra-disciplinary approach for the classification of per-
ceived phenomena. he is still -:orling fre a conservative
base. Coser's notions of equiliLrium as well as conflict
r.-o primarily centered around a structurvl-functionali.st
perspective. Cosr works from the :sumption that conflict
can be justified (as if it had to Le) if it contributes to
the functional aspects of an existant society. The nega-
tive connotations of the relatienship between dysfunction
and conflict are very much evident. Coser constantly tends
to base the "positive" aspects of conflict on function. In
a sense he is saying, if conflict has a social function then
it can't he all had; dysfunction is positive only when it
Las function. The negative value ascribed to conflict and
cent dysfunction is maintained and tl.J.erred fror: the
appr:ch
to what is presented as present day conflict theory. The
sinc, conservative preeccupations with stability and order is
rlaintained througheut Coser's (Simmel's) view of conflict.
The :'.anner in -hich Coser deals with conflict could
easily serve as an elaboration on the notion of dynamic
equilibriur. The io1oLical theory of homeostatis rcga-
tionships translated into sociology by Comte and Spencer
is similar to dynamic equilibriur:, in many respects. The
::.ajor factor of dysfunction within thc Lie-system is the
over development of onL particular force in relation to
another. A disequilibrium or conflict arises. The entire
process of conflict is,actally a process of movement toward
J renewed state of :quili'.1rium.
in sane manner, cc—Tlict arises out of
,.:see:.::liUrium and li a process of adaptation to a
ri..no state of eq:.4ilflirium (lattni conflict). Conflict is
tnereft:re seen aF beneficial when /clated t.,-; internal adapta-
tion directed toward equilibrium;
-1f.1 
an equilibrium similar
to a Parsonian perspective.
One safe2uard against conflict disrupting
the consens:!%1 Tasis of the relationship, how-
ever, is contained in the social structure ltsy'f;
it is provi.led Icy the ;nstitutionalization and
tolerance of conflict.°°
The various aspects of conflict which are perceived as
disruptive are Coser, as the structural-functionalists,
.a.ladaptive ele;-..cats entire social systen.. The
:irrclenc _ev,r, ;c:wicn conflict theery (L:n (oser) and
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structural-functionalism is the consequent posiive aspects
of the maladaptation (conflict) as viewed by Coser. In a
similar 7.anner what may normally be labeled as a major func•
ticnal eleent by structural-functionalists is presented by
Coser as havin;:, dysfunctienal consequences for the total
social system in the long run.
Institutions k,hich offer substitute channels
for the release of aggressiveness Lay be dysfunc-
tional for Cze social system in the sane way as
neurotic symptom§i are dysfunctional for the per-
sonality system.
This juxtaposition of the functional elements of con-
flict and the dysfunctienz,1 aspects of functicnal elee,!ts
can be translated the simple, t1-,cugh nut :cfuund,
,stater%e:A that functional cieLr:s are funcIlenal une evs-
functional elements ate dysfunctional. Mc point that
Coser is try114, to maLe simply is that :It was perceived
and labeled as usually functional elements are not neces-
sarily static in those functional qualities. ;That we label
as dysfunctional usually may, lnewisc, also have functicnal
aspects at times (more often than not in the long run). The
base for his qualitative judgement of function, ,ewexer,
retains the same criteria of secietal stability and mainte-
nance as the traditional equilil,rium perspective.
. ..conflict tends to be dysfunctional for a
social structure in which tl:cre is no c: _rsuf-
ficicnt toleration and institutionalizatien of
inflict. The intensity cf
threatens to 'tear apart,' YLich at acs the
51Ibid., p. 46.
censensual iasis of a social syster, is relatedto the rigidity of the structure. What threatensthe equilibriu a struet.,:e is net con-flict as but the rigidity itself which per-mits hostilities to accumulate and to be channeledalong one major ii,ne of cleavage once thcy breakout in conflict.'
It is evident that the concerns of the structural-
functicnalist, the preoccupation with the sanctity of equili-
brium, is also a major concern for Loser. Equilibrium is a
state of beir4; which is threatened by dysfunction, it is
not the state of being which adversely effects the general
process of ccnflict. His priorities are established. His
conceptuzil tools are reflective of the general notions and
ephasis of the structural-functionalist. Though Coser
.cessity of the relatici.,ship between functional -
is:. al.: is strongly influenced Ly its
broad operaticnal scheme. Conflict and equilibriu!Ti tend to
become ele;:tents in a dynamic equilibrium maintained within
the general tradition of the structural-functionalist ideo-
logy.
Coser in :,any ways has dealt more effectively with the
process of dynamic equilibrium as related to conflict than
have many of his forebearers. Though not presenting very
nueh of an alternative to conservative consensual based
sociology, he has atte:Tted to deal nore convincingly with
various :-spocts of function and dysfunction in rtin
te the h' r'j Lot icr f cr_f:',t. A.s- a conflict fanctionali.,t
u a „ 2
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Loser has demythicalized the coatructed necessary ralation-
ship between function and equilibria:' nd has added at least
another divension to the predominant ideological base of
sociology.
In the er,crgence of what is held to be present day con-
flict theory 7:alf Dahreadorf has arisen as one of the lcad-
ing conflict theorists, present in a revitalized "thcory"
„r class and class conflict in industrial society. In his
article "Out of Utopia: Towards a Reorientation of Socio-
logical Analysis," iahrendorf calls for a re-examination of
the prcdominance of equilibrium theory and a new effc.:: to
rccoaatitute sociolc_a: thrcagh a r:.or - 7c;.. analysis
of chanz,e a a_ conflict. The ho sms1 c)f dic-aili-
briaa thcary is oatwardly roject,d fci its inability te.
handle t.L coaL(nt of change and for 11.s static actions
concerning conflict. For Dahrendorf a more realistic view
of change and conflict,can be found in the expansion and
7.odification of a basic ,Tarxist analysis of class and pro-
cess.
Though outaardly rejecting a :Tarxist approach in the
conceptualization of societal (class) structure and change,
in ,:lass and Class Conflict in Industrial Societics, Dahren-
derf in eEsense tends to present a acdification net rcjection
of —arxisI class thcory. his aaalysis of ::aryaist tacts of
cTh ia relatica :o newly ariscn TIodificaaions in indus-
trial acciety is wall grounded. The needed e7phasis on roots
of powcr and authority as related to control versus ownership
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of the means eC production becomes inclusive ef a new develop-
ment within conte7porary industrial scciety, the rise cf the
managerial class. The concept of a ranagerial elite with
consequent 1,oler through control :iet .as dealt wit!,
in 'Iill's Pcv:cr Elite and White Collar (especially in the
latter) . ut is related more thoroughly to basic —arxist tenets
by Dahreneorf.
Throughout his work Dahrendorf concerns himself with
the new developments of class structure and industrialization
in relation to mere traditional interpretations of class.
!-:odifications or additiens of the cutgrowths of the
rise c hc Jarer:.:1_ -elite" in roI:.tion to the notion of
the cor.lIel I the neans cf Fi. odoction is th .gical exten-
sion and --eotLr:t of the expansiAe development of the Middle
class en tote.
Though Dahrendorf does deal much more effectively with
the notien of conflict (class conflict at that) and recog-
nizes the basic radical critical traditicn of arx and Hegel,
there are several major preblems with which he is confronted
and does not resolve.
The 3round from which narx drew his notion of the inevi-
tibliity oi class conflict and chone was the necessity of
the dialectic. The inherent neEotion of existing particu-
l-rs of a !listoric•1 moment is the loiical ant gret:1 of
the prooe.-7s of the dialectical "law. The noticn of eloss
conflict was merely the extension of the logicality of the
dialectic. The ground for !:arxist class analysis can be
feund in its philosophic base--the process c:f inherent nega-
tion and "going beyond" the cxistont to its legation.
Throoh the ideological acceptanco of the dialectic a base
for an intra-ideological logic Lnd categori:::tion
iihrc:Idorl through his rejection of the dialectic di :cards
the bast_ fion which the logic of class analysis is extende.i.
:ithout the construction of a new philosophic base the logi-
cality nf class conflict boccries n part of a non-exist -.nt
theoretical syste;,. and becomes acceptable as an a priori
particular. Dahrendorf needed a system of thought in which
his modified class analysis woulc: fit. re turned rcadilv
to the e:,i'taat str7:ct,r::1-functier:-::ist fr
alteratic7. :r thc arxist c7 , tonct a..ld the :ejection
of the :7arxi:-t plii*sophid base, he modified
and :0 t. point that it could riI inc a
functionalist frame provided that there was not the imme-
diate necessity of an equilibrium base. The rolo f inhercnt
conflict was borrowed from Marx and adapted to the notion
of dynamic equilibrium so that total equilibrium or balance
would he impossible. Dahrendorf's concept of the adaptation
and institutionalization of conflict was integrated into a
functionalist framc and lecame similar to Coser's
c teorization of conflict functionalism.
. . .a strcr,g, case can bQ Liado for group conflict
having colvequences 1.:hich, if not 'functional" ore
utterly neccry for social procet.s. This
eac: rests on the distinction !letween the two
faces of society—a distinction which underlies
our discussions throughout this study [Class and 
Conflict in Industrial Society]. It is perhaps
r'.•;
proof of the necessity of distin-
guishing tese two faces that conflict itself,
the crucial category in terms of the coercion
codel, has two faces, i.e., that Of contributing
to the integration of social "systems" and that
of Eaking change.
actigh illerendorf have been at.lirably
expre5se:1 1.y L. Coser. . 5')
Though laarendorf is net as preoccupied with the notion
of equilibriur (even inclusive o conflict as Coser) he
l'eards the re ,nlatiun of conflict as a function of
institutions. lie deals primarily in the legitimization of
conflict behavior which 1:econes an accepted (adaptive) func-
tion or the social systl, and relates it to the notion of
-de - ociatic r,(ility. The more flexible (de..-
; '
fcr
the neti.': of dyi a .1. discquili-
briur. or inbalance in the structural-functionalist approach
tho,:gh ic T theory conflict can-it c resolved,
just regulated.
From a functionalist perspective a major function of
1,- 7;( precet-ses of equilibrium is the resolution of
cchflict situations (disequilibriur) which night arise.
ri . s process c:; of internal adaptation do ttzLo place he-
rercF c.c.,r1ict (In :isegoi2ihri.ir) and syme
3E 5troctur.11 man:fe,ti,tions of t:.c
3 1a1 Iilahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrir.1
(Stanfor:. California: Stanford Iniversity Press,
‹ystem do take place. The notion of internal resolveLent
of ,:ysfunction and conflict is a prirc eicent ia many
theories of equilibrium, organicisT, anL! structural-func-
tionalism.
Dahrendorf ,:cals in a sir.ilar manner with the role of
institutionalized conflict as an e::arple of internal conflict
regulation.
The place of legal institutions in conflict
regulation is rare accurately descritcd, however, 54
by what in industry is usually called arbitration.
This example, as well as all of the three forms of conflict
regulation which 1;ahrendorf presents tend to worl, fru.. the
intra-c notinns of the .al-functionalist
perspectitc.
angc is of t1,-
tradicticns to .Lether
s .....stcy. or within ici
S5by identifying both cateporizatinns of cLnnie as the care.
The internal regulation of conflict for Dahrendorf is
rani lest in the structure's ability to
extent and intensity of the conflict.
does not present
adapt and control the
Though Dahrendorf
the notion of the possibility of resolve-
7,ent, the reasons for the inherent conflict between elercntal
forces within the system is not presented. The necessity of
cc:.flict found within the Marxist philosophic base is not to
'L fc„:11.: in the philosophic ground of structural-functionalism.
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functionalism and 7Tarxist social thought, Dahrendorf is left
in the predicament of explanation without necessity. The
conservatism he rejects in the functionalist approach he
reconstructs in his new conflict functionalism via the
institutionalization of conflict and the intra-structural
systemization of conflict regulation. The radical critical
ideology from which Dahrendorf works to extend his basic
class analysis (arxism) becomes lost in the legitimation
of conflict through arbitration, conciliation, ar.d media-
Lion. The revolutionary character
(in spite of its many conservative
of :Tarxist analysis
elements) has been trans-
formed by :lahrendorf into the idcolog c: "liberal" socio-
Crder ant: , the lodestar of conflict
regulation. For Pahrendorf conflict may not be resolved, it
;hay still re -::..ain :1.cat inherent tensinn within the exis-
tence of the social system, though the overt manifestations
of disequilibrium and conflict must be regulated. The con-
servatism of the structural-functionalists and of the
theories of equilibrium have been transformed by Dahrenclorf
into the liberal ideology of contemporary sociology; a
liberalism based a conservative reaction to the develop-




1-,ersiLetive the purimse of this presentatien
:,as been ..:ofold:
I. To examine, in part, sociology as a discil_:line
and as an ideology;
2. To oxin:dne so:e of the processes involved in the
fr- -;- ,;.,;.ion of an ideole,; in relation te the class-




„le fully the role of sociology
as an 1 010,y rso.c of tc processes of ideological forma-
tion wer,_- presented in Chapters II and III. The ci,ntent of
t-Lesc foundatiL. rrOL. L,ere
task of exa: i the dove]. p:ent of the diz,cipline
of socielc : could tz-.he place.
In _la:Inter II the ir,probability of r;:!:ing operative




,and 1 fl 1n, rcsi.tIon
cf idec".e01 c'xice. 'no a nri,yi acceptance or frame
G1
of reference, "it l, corrcsj i1Ii conce.,)tual mani:estatio--
an value connotations, was presented Z.s the upon
ideologies are founed. The necessity of choice and
perceptual classification became the '.ase for the necessity
of ideology.
dhapter III, as the immediate extension of Chapter IT
further concerned itself with the elcr:ents of ideological
fori.atien and process. Varicus factors which intervene in
the developent of an ideological base were exardned as in-
herent tendencies within the process of concept construction
and categorization. Scientific collectivism, the fallacy el
cencreteness, nrd thr Weave. n noti: of -
ti\L' an: -dinlectical- t in the creation of an stract
scCological rea:ity, were discussed _len4,ents in the
develoi—entofideolol yandtheneral , 1)roces:- toc.rd socio-
logical and scientific reification. It 1.as fron this frame-
:ork (noting the processes described and mentioned in
Chapters II and III) that the folling chapters, Chapters
IV and V, were presented.
Tracing the development of an ideology, Chapter IV
presented sociology as a conservative reaction to the French
Revolution. The r:onisn and organicistic notiens cf that
reaction served a. the base fro. hid. the concept e,
transfered frorii the natural and p:lysical .,ciences
-o t:e social. :-clowin fro;: Cc .tc te Spencer to
and to the general view of the structural-functional approach
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modifications have taken place and a new concern for meta-
disciplinary examination has arisen, t.le mainstream of con-
temporary sociology continues to find its ideological Lase
in the root of reaction.
". e
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